WebM&M: Case Studies

A 2-year-old girl presented to the emergency department (ED) with joint swelling and rash following an upper respiratory infection. After receiving treatment and being discharged with a diagnosis of allergic urticaria, she returned the following day with worsening symptoms. Suspecting an allergic reaction to amoxicillin, the ED team prepared to administer methylprednisolone. However, the ED intake technician erroneously switched the patient’s height and weight in the electronic health record (EHR), resulting in an excessive dose being ordered and dispensed. An automatic error message was generated due to the substantial difference from previous weights, but this message was overlooked by the ED technician and the data entry error was not detected or corrected. The commentary discusses the importance of verifying medication orders before administration, optimizing alert notifications to minimize the risk of alert fatigue, and the role of root cause analysis to identify factors contributing to medication error

A 38-year-old man with end-stage renal disease (ESRD) on chronic hemodialysis was admitted for nonhealing, infected lower leg wounds and underwent a below-knee amputation. He suffered from postoperative pain at the operative stump and was treated for four days with regional nerve blocks, as well as gabapentin, intermittent intravenous hydromorphone (which was transitioned to oral oxycodone) and oral hydromorphone. The patient subsequently developed severe metabolic encephalopathy due to overdose of both gabapentin and opiates and failure to reduce medication doses in the setting of ESRD. The commentary discusses pain management and the signs of gabapentin toxicity in patients with renal dysfunction, as well the implications of clinical decision support-related alert fatigue and approaches to reduce adverse events arising from drug-disease interactions.

A powerful anti-clotting medication is ordered for a patient admitted for coronary intervention. Due to a forcing function in the computer order entry system, the intern enters an arbitrary maintenance infusion rate, assuming that the pharmacy will fix it if it is wrong. The pharmacy dispenses it as written, and the nurse administers it—underdosing the patient by a factor of 40.